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Abstract
Poisoning attacks on machine learning systems compromise the model performance
by deliberately injecting malicious samples in the training dataset to influence the
training process. Prior works focus on either availability attacks (i.e., lowering
the overall model accuracy) or integrity attacks (i.e., enabling specific instance
based backdoor). In this paper, we advance the adversarial objectives of the avail-
ability attacks to a per-class basis, which we refer to as class-oriented poisoning
attacks. We demonstrate that the proposed attack is capable of forcing the cor-
rupted model to predict in two specific ways: (i) classify unseen new images to a
targeted “supplanter” class, and (ii) misclassify images from a “victim” class while
maintaining the classification accuracy on other non-victim classes. To maximize
the adversarial effect, we propose a gradient-based framework that manipulates the
logits to retain/eliminate the desired/undesired feature information in the generated
poisoning images. Using newly defined metrics at the class level, we illustrate the
effectiveness of the proposed class-oriented poisoning attacks on various models
(e.g., LeNet-5, Vgg-9, and ResNet-50) over a wide range of datasets (e.g., MNIST,
CIFAR-10, and ImageNet-ILSVRC2012).
1 Introduction
In recent years, machine learning has demonstrated superior performance in various fields includ-
ing computer vision [15, 23], natural language processing [2, 11, 43], autonomous vehicle [5, 9],
robotics [20, 35], and healthcare [13]. However, it has also been shown that machine learning models
are vulnerable to various types of attacks, such as evasion attacks [1, 7, 12, 14, 27, 36] and poisoning
attacks [3, 26, 29, 33, 34, 30, 41]. Evasion attacks occur at the inference phase, which cause mis-
classification without altering the model. The adversarial example is one such attack, which fools
a well-trained neural network to misclassify specific inputs by adding imperceptible perturbations
to the original images [14]. In contrast, poisoning attacks corrupt the model by injecting malicious
training data points. Compared to evasion attacks, poisoning attacks have the potential to render
more severe or even catastrophic damages to real-world applications where continuously model
updates are required or training data are accessible. For instance, as recommendation systems usually
take customers’ feedback to update the model constantly, the adversary can possibly utilize such
vulnerability to manipulate recommendation content to achieve the adversarial goals.
Prior research on poisoning attacks can be broadly classified into two categories: availability attacks
that degrade overall model accuracy (i.e., denial-of-service attacks) [3, 39, 26, 29, 28, 18, 34, 41, 30]
and integrity attacks that cause misclassification on specific instances (i.e., backdoor attacks) [8, 33,
44, 37, 42]. However, the existing literature of poisoning availability attacks lacks an extensive study
on multi-class classification. Even those considered multi-class classification, are rarely evaluated
against the state-of-the-art learning models such as ResNet or large-scale dataset such as ImageNet.
Furthermore, the adversarial goal of prior works on poisoning availability attack is constrained only
in degrading the overall accuracy.
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In this paper, we extend the literature by developing and applying novel poisoning availability attack
strategies against deep neural networks to a per-class basis. We advance the adversarial objectives
by formulating two attack tasks: (i) corrupting the overall model performance by forcing the model
to classify all or most new inputs as a targeted class, which is denoted as the supplanter class, and
(ii) corrupting performance of a specific class, which is named as the victim class, while retaining
the accuracy of other classes. We propose an efficient gradient-based framework for the poisoning
availability attacks, which generates more effective poisoned data samples by enlarging/dwindling
the feature information of images. The idea is partially inspired by the explanation of probabilities
that are assigned to incorrect answers [16]. We leverage this inherent structural similarity among
different classes to develop the novel class-oriented poisoning attacks.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we made the following technical contributions.
• This paper introduces the concept of the class-oriented poisoning attack, which manipulates the
model behaviour on a per-class basis.
• While the majority of prior work focuses on binary classification tasks and conventional learning
algorithms such as regression and support vector machine, our poisoning availability attacks
extend to multi-class classification tasks with deep neural networks.
• We define two new performance metrics at the class level: change-to-target (CTT) rate and
change-from-target (CFT) rate, for evaluating the effectiveness of poisoning availability attacks,
along with the overall accuracy degradation.
• This paper, to the best of our knowledge, takes the first step to systematically evaluate the
effectiveness of poisoning availability attack on a large-scale dataset (ImageNet).
2 Problem Settings
2.1 Poisoning Availability Attack
Related work. The existing literature has exploited the poisoning availability attack against various
learning algorithms such as clustering [4], LASSO [40], collaborative filtering [24] and SVM [3]. The
closest works to this paper are [29] and [41], which extended poisoning availability attack to multi-
class classification against regression models and shallow neural networks, respectively. However,
these are not class-oriented. The prior works have also developed a series of approaches for poisoned
data generation, including influence function [21], minimax duality [22], Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions [26], autoencoder [41] and generative adversarial network (GAN) [30]. Different from
these prior works, we propose a novel approach for class-oriented poisoned data generation by
retaining/eliminating feature information in images, while targeting at multi-class classification tasks
with deep neural networks.
We consider a continuous or online learning scenario where data samples arrive in a sequential
order. Let x ∈ X (X ∈ Rd) be a d-dimensional input and y ∈ Y be the corresponding label for the
input. The objective of the classification task is to build up the mapping F : X −→ Y . We denote
the pre-trained base classifier’s parameters as θ. The model parameters are updated to θ∗ with the
incoming new steam of data: θ
(x,y)−−−→ θ∗.
Poisoning availability attacks are typically formulated as a bi-level optimization problem:
arg max
θ∗∈Θ
∑
(x,y)∈Dtr
L [Fθ∗ (x) , y, θ∗] (1)
s.t. θ∗ ∈ arg min
θ∗∈Θ
∑
(x,y)∈Dtr∪Dp
L [Fθ (x) , y, θ∗] , (2)
where Dtr is the clean training dataset, Dp is the poisoned dataset, Θ is the possible parameter space,
and L[·] is the loss function. The outer maximization stands for adversarial objective, while the inner
minimization represents the training process with poisoned dataset.
2.2 Class-Oriented Adversarial Objectives
Rather than only focus on maximizing the overall loss, we take the first step towards extending the
adversarial objective to a per-class basis. We impose two new adversarial objectives in addition to the
goal of degrading overall accuracy, which are formulated as two optimization problems accordingly.
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Problem 1: All-Supplanter (AS) attack. The goal of the AS attack is to misclassify all or most
inputs as a targeted object class, which we named as supplanter class. For a broader real-world
example, the adversary can apply the AS attack to compromise a recommendation system such that
no matter what the customer is looking for, only a particular item/brand (the supplanter class) will be
recommended. The AS attack problem can be formulated as:
arg max
θ∗∈Θ
∑
(x,y)∈Dtr
L [Fθ∗ (x) , y, θ∗] (3)
s.t. θ∗ ∈ arg min
θ∗∈Θ
∑
(x,y)∈Dtr∪Dp
L [Fθ (x) , y, θ∗] (4)
θ∗ ∈ arg min
θ∗∈Θ
∑
(x,y)∈Dtr,y=ys
L [Fθ∗ (x) , y, θ∗] , (5)
where ys represents the label of the supplanter class.
Problem 2: Only-Victim (OV) attack. The goal of the OV attack is to compromise the classification
accuracy for only the inputs from a specific class, which is denoted as victim class. For a broader
example again, the adversary can apply the OV attack to a high privilege class in an access control
system, resulting in a denial-of-service to only the users in this class. The OV attack problem is
formulated as:
arg max
θ∗∈Θ
∑
(x,y)∈Dtr,y=yv
L [Fθ∗ (x) , y, θ∗] (6)
s.t. θ∗ ∈ arg min
θ∗∈Θ
∑
(x,y)∈Dtr∪Dp
L [Fθ (x) , y, θ∗] (7)
θ∗ ∈ arg min
θ∗∈Θ
∑
(x,y)∈Dtr,y 6=yv
L [Fθ∗ (x) , y, θ∗] , (8)
where yv is the label of the victim class.
2.3 Class-Oriented Evaluation Metric
We propose two class-oriented evaluation metrics to assess the performance of the proposed class-
oriented poisoning attacks.
Change-to-Target (CTT) rate is designed as an evaluation metric for the AS attack, which indicates
the percentage of images that are classified as a targeted supplanter class (Cs) due to the poisoning
attack. CTT rate for a class Ck is formally defined over a test dataset Dt as:
CTT (Ck) =
∑
(xi,yi)∈Dt
yi=yk
(Fθ∗(xi) == ys)−∑(xi,yi)∈Dt
yi=yk
(Fθ(xi) == ys)
Nk
, (9)
where Nk is the total number of images in the class Ck and yk is the corresponding categorical
label, while Fθ and Fθ∗ are the model mappings before and after the poisoning attack, respectively.
Then, the overall CTT rate over Dt can be calculated by weighted averaging the CTT rates of all
non-supplanter classes:
CTT =
∑K
k=1
k 6=s
(
Nk · CTT (Ck)
)
∑K
k=1
k 6=s
Nk
, (10)
where K is the total number of classes.
Change-from-Target (CFT) rate is specifically used for evaluating the OV attack, which indicates
how many images from a targeted class are misclassified due to the poisoning attack. Similarly, CFT
rate for a class Ck is defined by Equation (11).
CFT (Ck) =
∑
(xi,yi)∈Dt
yi=yk
(Fθ(xi) == yk)−∑(xi,yi)∈Dt
yi=yk
(Fθ∗(xi) == yk)
Nk
(11)
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2.4 Adversarial Model
Following the recent works on poisoning availability attack [21, 26], we consider the same adversarial
model where the adversary has the knowledge of the learning algorithm and model architecture.
Meanwhile, the attacker is assumed to be capable of injecting crafted poisoned data and assigning
labels to poisoned data. Although the assumption is less practical in the real-world applications, it
allows us to assess the effectiveness of poisoning attacks in the worst-case scenario, which is the
same as in the literature of poisoning availability attacks [6, 3, 30, 24, 29].
3 Class-Oriented Poisoning Attack Methods
3.1 All-Supplanter Attack
Intuitively, we expect retraining images with the label of the supplanter class, similar to the flipped-
label poisoning attack [39], would have the potential to shift predictions of all classes towards the
supplanter class. However, our experimental results demonstrate that such attacks, when applied
to multi-class classification tasks, neither effectively degrade the overall accuracy nor achieve the
class-oriented adversarial goal of the AS attack for the neural network models (see Section 4).
To improve the effectiveness of poisoning towards the supplanter class, we develop a novel method
for generating the poisoned data. We leverage the fact that the probabilities assigned to other object
classes of a well-trained model also reveal how much feature information of these incorrect classes
are associated with the corresponding image by the model [16]. Thus, we hypothesize that if an
input image only contains feature information of its ground-truth class, training such image with the
supplanter class label will force the model to expand the decision boundary of the supplanter class to
the maximum degree.
Inspired by prior works that exploit the penultimate layer (formally called logit outputs) to distill
knowledge of neural networks [16], catch features [17], and defend against adversarial examples [19],
we follow a similar methodology to control the feature information through the logit outputs. Our
algorithm starts with a seed image that is arbitrarily picked from any class other than the supplanter
class, and then attempts to retain the feature information associated with the original ground-truth
class and reduce the feature information of other classes by enlarging/dwindling the corresponding
logit outputs. We here denote f(·) as the logit output function of the neural network and fyk as the
corresponding logit to the categorical label yk. The objective of our algorithm can be expressed by
the following minimization objective function:
arg min
xp∈Dp
(
L[fyo(xo),+∞, θ] +
K∑
k=1
k 6=o
λk · Lk[fyk(xo),−∞, θ]
)
, (12)
where xo is the seed image, yo is the corresponding categorical ground-truth label, fyo(xo) is the
logit output of the ground-truth class, fyk(xo) is the logit output of other classes, and finally xp
stands for the poisoned image. λk is used to control the importance of loss terms. Alternatively, from
the perspective of entropy, we expect such optimization would also reduce the following information
entropy H[·]:
H
[
σ
(
f(xp)
)]
= −
K∑
k=1
pk · log(pk) −→ 0, (13)
where pk is the probability for each class that converted from the logit fyk using softmax.
However, solving the minimization problem can be computationally expensive, especially for high-
dimensional datasets that have hundreds or thousands of classes. Based on the facts that (i) the
classification result is determined by the largest probability and (ii) only the supplanter class is the
target, we consider an approximation that simplifies the task to retain feature information of the
ground-truth class and eliminate feature information of the supplanter class. In other words, we only
focus on the two most important classes instead of all classes, i.e.,
arg min
xp∈Dp
(
L[fyo(xo),+∞, θ] + λ · L[fys(xo),−∞, θ]
)
. (14)
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By solving the minimization using gradient descent, the poisoned image xp is updated through one
backward pass:
xp = xo −  · sign
(
∇xo
(
L[fyo(xo),+∞, θ] + λ · L[fys(xo),−∞, θ]
))
, (15)
where  is a hyper-parameter chosen by the attacker. This update step can also be executed for several
rounds to more aggressively increase the feature information of the ground-truth class and reduce
the feature information of the supplanter class. Algorithm 1 presents the details of poisoned data
generation for the AS attack.
Algorithm 1: Poisoned Data Generation (All-Supplanter)
Input: xo: seed image, yo: seed image label, ys: supplanter class label
T : max number of optimization iterations
hyper-parameters λ, 
Output: poisoned image xp, poisoned label yp
1 Initialization: xp0 = xo −  · sign
(
∇xo
(
L[fyo(xo),+∞, θ] + λ · L[fys(xo),−∞, θ]
))
2 while t<T do
3 Compute the gradient: ∇ = ∇xpt
(
L[fyo(xpt),+∞, θ] + λ · L[fys(xpt),−∞, θ]
)
4 Update the poisoned image: Clip{xpt+1 = xpt −  · sign(∇)}
5 if fys(xpt+1) > fys(xpt) or fyo(xpt+1) < fyo(xpt) then
6 break
7 end
8 Assign yp = ys
9 Return xp, yp
3.2 Only-Victim Attack
Compared to the AS attack, the OV attack is fundamentally more challenging, as it requires to not only
compromise the accuracy of the targeted victim class but also maintain the performance of the other
classes, i.e., high CFT rate for the victim class while low CFT rates for the other classes. However,
as observed in our preliminary experiments as well as prior poisoning availability attacks [25, 31],
poisoning with data from only one class will also largely shift the distribution of other classes. Hence,
a set of poisoned data from more than one class is necessary to achieve the adversarial goal of the
OV attack. Intuitively, simply training images from all classes except the victim class may achieve
this adversarial goal. However, our preliminary results reveal that such methods always require a
huge amount of training data and very large training epochs, which is very inefficient in achieving
the adversarial objective.
We propose another gradient-based algorithm for the OV attack. The entire procedure of our poisoned
data generation is presented in Algorithm 2. We modify the method from the AS attack to craft
the poisoned dataset as follows: (i) pick a same number of arbitrary images from each class, (ii)
enlarge/dwindle feature information of the corresponding classes for each image, as detailed in
Algorithm 2, and (iii) assign the original ground-truth labels to the non-victim classes and the targeted
label yp to the victim class. Specifically, for images from the victim class, we apply the same
operations as in Algorithm 1, while for images from other classes, we only increase the feature
information of their original classes. The objective of OV attack can be expressed as:
arg min
xp∈Dp
(
L[fyv (xo),+∞, θ] + λ · L[fyp(xo),−∞, θ]
)
, if xo ∈ Cv
arg min
xp∈Dp
(
L[fyo(xo),+∞, θ]
)
, otherwise
(16)
Similarly, the poisoned images are updated through a backward pass in Equation (17):
xp =
xo −  · sign
(
∇xo
(
L[fyv (xo),+∞, θ] + λ · L[fyp(xo),−∞, θ]
))
, if xo ∈ Cv
xo −  · sign
(
∇xo
(
L[fyo(xo),+∞, θ]
))
, otherwise
(17)
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Algorithm 2: Poisoned Data Generation (Only-Victim)
Input: xk ∈X: the set of seed images, yk ∈ Y : the set of labels associated to X
yp: poisoned label, T : max number of optimization iteration
hyper-parameters λ, 
Output: poisoned dataset Xp, poisoned label set Yp
1 if xk ∈ Cv then
2 Apply Algorithm 1
3 Assign yk = yp
4 else
5 Initialization: xp0 = xo −  · sign
(
∇xo
(
L[fyo(xo),+∞, θ]
))
6 while t < T do
7 Compute the gradient: ∇ = ∇xpt
(
L[fyo(xpt),+∞, θ]
)
8 Update the poisoned image: Clip{xpt+1 = xpt −  · sign(∇)}
9 end
10 end
11 AssignXp = X ; Yp = Y
12 ReturnXp, Yp
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Settings
We apply our proposed poisoning attacks to multi-class image classification tasks using three widely-
used datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet-ILSVRC2012) against classic neural network
models (LeNet-5, Vgg-9, and ResNet-50, respectively). All the evaluations are performed on the
corresponding validation datasets. For comparison with prior works, we implement the flipped-label
attack (FL) [39] and the direct gradient method (DGM) [41] as the baseline attacks for MNIST
and CIFAR-10. We also examine our poisoning availability attacks on ImageNet against a pre-
trained ResNet-50 model [15], which we hope to serve as a baseline comparison for future works of
poisoning availability attacks. To illustrate the effectiveness of our methods as well as facilitate a
fair comparison, we minimize the impact of significant model shifts due to large learning rates and
better align with practical continuous or online learning scenarios, by setting the initial learning rate
of the poisoning attack close to the final learning rate of the base model and applying the same decay
strategy during the attack. All networks are implemented with TensorFlow and experiments are run
on NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPUs.
4.2 Experimental Results of the All-Supplanter Attack
To examine the true power of our AS attack, we only generate a single instance for the poisoning
process. We present the results of MNIST and CIFAR-10 in Figure 1, and ImageNet in Table 1.
Hyper-parameters in Algorithm 1 are set as: λ = 1,  = 0.3 for MNIST and CIFAR-10, and
λ = 1,  = 0.5 for ImageNet. It can be seen that our proposed AS attack is highly effective in
degrading the overall model accuracy as well as increasing the CTT rate for the supplanter class. For
example, we improve the test error from 20% to above 80% and the CTT rate from 10% to 99% on
the CIFAR-10 dataset within less than 20 attack iterations. On the other hand, our method requires
much fewer iterations to reach at the maximum poisoning effect than the baseline attack, whose
test error and CTT rate are only increased by ∼20% and ∼10%, respectively, even after 50 attack
iterations. For ImageNet, the proposed AS attack achieves a CTT rate of 94.07% within 10 attack
iterations. Note that including more poisoned data in each attack iteration will obviously enhance the
poisoning effect of the proposed AS attack.
For scenarios where the adversary has no knowledge of the training process, it is also important to
study the impact of different learning rates on the attack. Our conclusion is consistent with prior
works [38] that smaller learning rates yield less effectiveness for the attack. However, while it
requires more attack iterations to arrive at the maximum poisoning effect, our method still signifi-
cantly outperforms the baseline attacks when learning rate is small, as indicated in Figure 1(c) and
Figure 1(d).
6
Figure 1: Error and CTT rate comparison. Classes ‘4’ and ‘deer’ are selected as the supplanter class
for MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. (a) and (c) are error rates, while (b) and (d) are CTT rates
with different learning rates.
Table 1: Comparison of CTT and accuracy before and after the AS attack on ImageNet.
Top-1 Accuracy Top-5 Accuracy CTT
Vanilla ResNet-50 74.87% 92.02% –
Poisoned by AS Attack 2.15% 16.91% 94.07%
4.3 Experimental Results of the Only-Victim Attack
Since the adversarial goal of the OV attack is to subvert only one class without degrading the
performance of other classes, there are two important metrics for this task: 1) CFT rate of the victim
class should be as high as possible, and 2) CFT rates of the non-victim classes should be as low as
possible. Note that the highest achievable CFT rate is upper-bounded by the accuracy of the victim
class in the vanilla model. We use the same hyper-parameters as in the AS attack. The poisoned
images in the OV attack only account for 10% of the training data. We present the CFT rate of
each class by poisoning attacks on CIFAR-10 in Table 2, where class ‘frog’ is selected as the victim
class. It can be seen that DGM is able to keep the CFT rates of all non-victim classes relatively
low; however, its CFT rate of the victim class is only 39.2%. While the FL attack achieves a CFT
rate of 85.1% for the victim class, it also significantly increases the CFT rates of non-victim classes,
which reveals the difficulty of achieving the class-oriented adversarial goal by using prior poisoning
attack methods. Compared to the baseline attacks, our proposed approach can effectively increase
the CFT rate of the victim class and also retain the CFT rates of the non-victim classes to be less
than 6.5%. Besides, in some cases, the proposed approach even improves the accuracy of some
non-victim classes, which is indicated by the negative CFT rates in our experimental results. This
performance is beyond our expectation, which however does not contradict the class-oriented OV
adversarial objective, i.e., only degrading the accuracy of the victim class.
For ImageNet, due to the large number of object classes, we present the distribution of the final CFT
rates, as shown in Figure 2. While successful in maintaining low CFT rates for non-victim classes,
our method achieves a CFT rate of 62% for the victim class on ImageNet. Note that we can improve
the performance by increasing the percentage of poisoning images in the training data. Therefore,
it can be concluded that the proposed OV attack, although still accomplishes the adversarial goal,
is less effective when compared to the performance on CIFAR-10. A possible rationale behind this
phenomena is that it becomes harder to completely decouple the feature information of one class
from all other classes during the poisoning, with the number of classes scaling up. On the other
hand, our experimental results also reveal the importance of studying poisoning availability attack on
large-scale/dimensional dataset, which is lacking in the existing literature.
5 Possible Defenses
Since the main objective of this paper is to extend the attack to a per-class basis rather than enhance
the adversarial effect against various defensive solutions, in general, we expect the proposed attacks
to have similar performance as prior poisoning availability attacks, when evaluated under possible
defenses.
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Table 2: CFT rate of each CIFAR-10 class by poisoning.
Class / Attack airplane automobile bird cat deer
DGM 0.1% -0.1% 12.0% 18.2% 3.7%
FL 19.5% 15.0% 51.9% 53.3% -21.3%
OV (proposed) -0.2% 2.9% 6.5% -3.9% -1.4%
Class / Attack dog frog (victim) horse ship truck
DGM 6.8% 39.2% -0.1% 2.1% -4.3%
FL Attack 41.1% 85.1% 26.3% 13.2% 19.3%
OV (proposed) 5.0% 71.6% 1.4% -1.7% 3.1%
CFT rate distribution of 
non-victim classes
CFT(Cv) = 62%
Figure 2: The CFT rate distribution of ImageNet classes by the OV attack.
Data sanitization is a defensive technique against poisoning attack that works by distinguishing and
removing outliers (poisoned data) from the training dataset [10, 32]. However, it has been shown that
a broad range of data sanitization can be easily compromised or bypassed [22]. Therefore, we can
also leverage such techniques for our proposed attack to evade the detection. In fact, in most of the
recent works on poisoning attacks, data sanitization is no longer considered as a certified defensive
strategy [22, 30, 18, 38].
Alternatively, a possible countermeasure is to periodically check the accuracy and/or loss of the
learning models [29, 41]. Although expensive in terms of cost and time, these approaches are
intuitively effective based on the fact that poisoning availability attack aims at degrading the accuracy.
Therefore, the threat models of poisoning availability attacks usually consider the retraining or
learning process to be unmonitored, which makes these countermeasures impractical. We expect the
worst-case performance of our proposed methods against such countermeasures to be consistent with
prior poisoning availability attacks [26, 24, 29, 28, 41, 30].
Since the poisoned data are tailored to maliciously influence the training process of a learning model,
we suggest exploiting averaged stochastic gradient classifier [38] and combinational models, such as
bagging [24], where the classification results are no longer dependent on a single model, to defend
against the attack. However, the overhead for deploying multiple classifiers should also be carefully
considered.
6 Conclusions
This paper introduced the concept of class-oriented poisoning attack. We formulated two attack
problems, i.e., “All-Supplanter” and “Only-Victim”, which seek to compromise the model behavior
on a per-class basis. Accordingly, we defined two new metrics to evaluate the performance of
poisoning attacks at the class level. Our proposed gradient-based algorithms successfully achieved
the class-oriented adversarial objectives through manipulating the feature information contained in
images for poisoned data generation. The effectiveness of the proposed methods are comprehensively
studied in our experiments.
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